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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Issue: Did the district court err in granting 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ruling that "the 
only issue of any alleged default remaining for trial is whether or 
not the January 1991 and/or February 1991 payments were made or 
timely tendered"? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court accords 
"no deference to the trial court's conclusions that the facts are 
not in dispute nor the court's legal conclusions based on those 
facts." Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt. 860 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 
App. 1993); Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co,, Inc>, 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 
App. 1991), cert, denied 832 P.2d 476 (1992). All relevant facts, 
including all inferences arising from such facts, shall be 
-construed in a light most favorable to the losing party. Kitchen, 
821 P.2d at 460. "If, after a review of the record, it appears 
that there is a material factual issue, [an appellate court] is 
compelled to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah 
App. 1959). "One sworn statement under oath [involving a material 
fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby 
precluding the entry of summary judgment." Id. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as a challenge to summary 
judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, because, by 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, this 
court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1988); Daniels v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
771 P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1989); accord Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & 
Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990); Barber v. Farmers Insu. 
Exch., 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 1988). 
2. Issue: Did the district court abuse its 
2 
discretion in awarding the Defendant attorney fees in the amount of 
$20,673.25 and costs in the amount of $503.50? 
Standard of Review: The award of attorney fees 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). 
A trial court's award of costs is likewise reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Nielson v. Nielson, 826 
P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Issue: Did the district court err in concluding 
that the Plaintiff was a breaching (defaulting) party under the 
uniform real estate contract, thus making the award of attorney 
fees inappropriate? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews 
the trial court's conclusions for correctness and accords no 
particular deference to such conclusions. Western Kane County 
Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 
1376, 1378 (Utah 1987) . 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Utah R. Civ P. 56(c) 
The [summary] j udgment 
sought shall be rendered 
3 
forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 7, 1991, Alvan and Karen Strasrypka, the fee 
owners of certain real property located in Salt Lake County, filed 
a complaint to foreclose on the subject property after the 
Defendants failed to make payments and provide proof of insurance 
on said property pursuant to the uniform real estate contract 
between the parties. (R. 2-6). Following, the Defendant's answer 
and counterclaim (R. 20-28), the Defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment that the contract was not in default and that the 
Plaintiffs had waived any right to require the Defendant to provide 
proof of insurance. (R. 44-45). That motion was denied. (R. 172-
74.). After significant discovery by both parties, the Defendant 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a summary 
determination that the only issue remaining for trial was whether 
the January and February 1991 payments due under the contract were 
timely made. (R. 280-81). That motion was granted. (R. 374-75). 
Following a trial on March 16, 1993, the district court entered 
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findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, dismissing 
Plaintiffs' cause of action and awarding judgment against 
Plaintiffs in the amount of $21,664.73. (R. 447-59). Plaintiffs' 
appeal from the judgment. (R. 466-67). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiffs, Alvan and Karen Strasrypka, are the 
joint owners of property located in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. (R. 96, fl 1). Prior to 1991, the Plaintiffs received 
monthly payments in the amount of $95.00 for the purchase of said 
property pursuant to a uniform real estate contract. (R. 96, I 2). 
During this time, the Plaintiffs were consistently informed that 
the subject property was insured as required under the contract. 
(R. 96, I 2). 
Some time prior to 1991 and without any knowledge by 
the Plaintiffs, the uniform real estate contract was assigned to 
Clella Glazier. (R. 97, I 3). The $95.00 monthly payment was 
consistently late. (R. 97, H 3). 
Plaintiffs did not receive the January 1991 or the 
February 1991 payments under the contract, therefore, on or about 
February 15, 1991, Plaintiffs phoned Ms. Glazier to inquire when 
the respective payments would be received. (R. 97, 5 4). At that 
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time, Ms. Glazier informed the Plaintiffs that she had sold the 
property on or about January 31, 1991, again without any notice to 
the Plaintiffs. (R. 97, S 4). The Plaintiffs were directed to 
contact Western States Title Company inasmuch as they were the 
closing agent. (R. 97, I 4). Plaintiffs immediately contacted 
Western States Title, however, were informed that the title company 
was unaware of any such transaction. (R. 97, 1[ 5). 
Sometime thereafter, on or about February 25, the 
Plaintiffs received a call from someone representing themselves as 
the closing agents on the subject property. (R. 97, I 6). The 
Plaintiffs informed the caller of the payoff amount on the 
contract, and also that the January 1991 and February 1991 contract 
payments had yet to be received. (R. 98, 5 6). On or about March 
15, 1991, the Plaintiffs received a check from Western States Title 
Company, No. 24606, dated February 26, 1991, and mailed in an 
envelope postmarked March 12, 1991. (Plaintiffs' exhibits 4 and 
5). The notation on the check indicated that it was for the 
January contract payment. (Plaintiffs' exhibit 4). Plaintiffs 
never received any payment prior to the February 26, 1991 check. 
(R. 100 1 15). 
Upon receipt of the February 26, 1991 payment, the 
Plaintiffs phoned Western States Title and informed them that they 
would not accept the payment inasmuch as they had yet to receive 
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any payment for January 1991. (R. 98, fl 8). Thereafter, on or 
about March 22, 1991, Plaintiffs forwarded check no. 24606 from 
Western States Title Company to their attorney who returned the 
check to the title company. (R. 98, f 9). 
On April 2, 1991, after no further response by the 
Defendants, the Plaintiffs mailed, by certified mail, a notice of 
default to Byron J. Wilson, the only party in privy with 
Plaintiffs, declaring the entire unpaid balance under the contract 
due and payable pursuant to paragraph 16 of the uniform real estate 
contract, which provides, in pertinent part: 
In the event of a failure to 
comply with the terms hereof the 
Buyer, or upon failure of the buyer to 
make any payment or payments when the 
same shall become due, or within 
thirty (30) days thereafter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the 
following alternative remedies: 
C. The Seller shall have the 
right, at his option, and upon 
written notice to the Buyer, 
to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due 
and payable, and may elect to 
treat this contract as a note 
and mortgage, and pass title 
to the Buyer subject thereto, 
and proceed immediately to 
foreclose the same in 
accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have 
the property sold and the 
proceeds applied to the 
payment of the balance owing 
including costs and attorney 
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fees; and the Seller may have 
a judgment for any deficiency 
which may remain. In the case 
of foreclosure, the Seller 
hereunder, upon the filing of 
a complaint, shall be 
immediately entitled to the 
appointment of a receiver to 
take possession of said 
mortgaged property and collect 
the rents, issue any profits 
therefrom and apply the same 
to the payment of the 
obligation hereunder, or hold 
the same pursuant to the order 
of the court; and the Seller, 
upon entry of judgment of 
foreclosure, shall be entitled 
to the possession of the said 
premises during the period of 
redemption. 
(R. 9-10 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). 
Plaintiffs received no response to the notice of 
default nor any communication whatsoever regarding the contract; 
thence on May 15, 1991, Plaintiffs mailed, by certified mail, a 
notice to all possible interest-holders in the property, including 
Westport Funding, informing them of the default under the contract. 
Thereafter, on May 30, 1991, an attorney for Westport Funding 
contacted Plaintiffs' counsel inquiring about the status of the 
contract. (R. 310). Following that conversation, on June 4, 1991, 
Plaintiffs' counsel received a letter and two checks dated June 4, 
1991 from Equities Management which purported to be the contract 
payments for the months of March, April, May and June 1991. 
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(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 11). However, inasmuch as Plaintiffs had 
previously filed the notice of default due to Defendants' failure 
to pay the January and February contract payments within 30 days of 
the due dates, Plaintiffs declined the payments. 
On June 7, 1991, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint to 
foreclose the uniform real estate contract pursuant to Utah law. 
(R. 2-7). Prior to trial, on or about January 29, 1993, the 
Defendant moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a 
determination that the only issue for trial was whether the January 
1991 and February 1991 payments under the contract were timely 
made. The district court granted that motion. Subsequently, on 
March 16, 1993, the matter was tried. Following trial, the court 
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, 
dismissing Plaintiffs' cause of action and awarding judgment 
against Plaintiffs as follows: 
a. $487.98 damages; 
b. $20,673.25 attorney fees; and 
c. $503.50 costs. 
(R. 447-59). Plaintiffs' appeal from the judgment. (R. 466-67). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The Defendant at issue in this case did not 
receive any notice of default until on or after May 15, 1991 and 
failed to make any payments to the Plaintiffs under the contract 
until on or about June 4, 1991. Accordingly, Defendant's failure 
to pay the March 1991 and April 1991 payments until after the 
default period constituted a default under the contract and the 
district court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, ruling that "the only issue of any alleged 
default remaining for trial is whether or not the January 1991 
and/or February 1991 payments were made or timely tendered." 
2. Inasmuch as there remains disputed material 
issues of fact which, as a matter of law, should have precluded the 
entry of summary judgment for the months of March and April, the 
award of attorney fees and costs must be reversed until such time 
as a final determination can be made as to that issue. 
3. Under the express terms of the uniform real 
estate contract, a defaulting party is liable for all costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees, arising from enforcement 
proceedings. In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs did not default 
under the contract to justify the award of attorney fees and costs. 
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in awarding 
Defendants attorney fees in the amount of $20,673.25 and costs in 
10 
the amount of $503.50. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RULING THAT 
"THE ONLY ISSUE OF ANY ALLEGED DEFAULT REMAINING FOR 
TRIAL IS WHETHER OR NOT THE JANUARY 1991 AND/OR 
FEBRUARY 1991 PAYMENTS WERE MADE OR TIMELY 
TENDERED." 
It is elementary that summary judgment is appropriate 
only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ron Case 
Roofing & Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989); accord Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 
376-77) (Utah App. 1993). Moreover, "unless there is a showing 
that the disfavored parties cannot produce evidence which would 
reasonably support a finding in their favor on a material or 
determinative issue of fact, a summary judgment is erroneous." 
Bridge v. Backman, 353 P.2d 909 (Utah 1960); accord Krantz v. Holt, 
819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1991) . 
In the instant case, the district court granted 
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that "the 
only issue of any alleged default remaining for trial is whether or 
not the January 1991 and/or February 1991 payments were made or 
11 
timely tendered•" However, because there was sufficient evidence 
before the district court that March 1991 and April 1991 payments 
were likewise at issue, the court erred in granting summary 
j udgment. 
In moving for partial summary judgment, Defendant, 
Westport Funding, claimed that Plaintiffs' action was limited to 
the months of January 1991 and February 1991 inasmuch as the 
complaint only referenced the April 2, 1991 default notice. 
However, such position is wholly inconsistent inasmuch as it is 
irrefutable that the first notice of any default received by 
Westport Funding was that notice dated May 15, 1991.1 Accordingly, 
at the time of such notice, the payments for the months of March 
1991 and April 1991 were not only at issue, but according to 
Plaintiffs' sworn affidavit, such payments had not been received. 
Further proof that the payments for March and April 1991 were at 
issue was the actual check that was ultimately issued to the 
Plaintiff for the months of March 1991 and April 1991 which was 
dated June 4, 1991, long after the running of the contractual grace 
1
 See Affidavit of Duane Cutler at I 4 and Defendant's 
consolidated memorandum in support of motions to set 
aside receiver and for summary judgment at 5 10. 
The uniform real estate contract does not 
specify the required form of notice, consequently, 
the May 15, 1991 notice constituted effective notice 
of default to Westport Funding, the only defendant 
at issue in this case. 
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period. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs' sworn statements and the 
actual check for the months of March and April 1991 were 
effectually the only direct evidence that such payments had not 
-been timely made2, summary judgment as to all months but January 
1991 and February 1991 was entirely inappropriate. 
Defendant, Westport Funding, further argued in support of its 
motion for summary judgment that it was not required to tender any 
monies subsequent to the April 2, 1991 default notice inasmuch as 
it would have been a futile act, citing Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. 
Washington, 161 P.2d 355 (Utah 1945). Again, however, such 
position is particularly inconsistent under the facts of this case. 
As provided heretofore, Defendant did not receive any 
notice as to the default under the contract until on or after May 
15, 1991. Consequently, as demonstrated by the record herein, at 
that time the Defendant could not possibly have known that tender 
of any payments, let alone those for March and April, which were 
already in default, would constitute a futile act. Home Owners' 
Defendant's affidavits in support of summary 
judgment merely state that Westport had tendered the 
payments due under the Contract for March, April, 
May and June 1991. See Affidavit of Duane Cutler at 
1 7. However, such payments were not tendered until 
on or about June 4, 1991, approximately one month 
after Defendant received the default notice. 
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Loan Corp. v. Washington, 161 P.2d 355, 358 (Utah 1945).3 Based 
on the foregoing, summary judgment should be reversed to allow the 
Plaintiffs to offer evidence regarding Defendant's default for 
those months under the contract4. 
II. BECAUSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT WARRANTED IN THIS 
CASE, THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
In the case at bar, the district court awarded the 
Defendant attorney fees in the amount of $20,673.25 and costs in 
the amount of $503.50. However, because there are disputed issues 
In fact, the basis for Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on this point was Mr. Strasrypka's 
deposition that he would not accept anything but 
full payment. However, Mr. Strasrypka was not 
deposed until December 2, 1992, over one and one-
half years after the payments were due. 
Accordingly, aside from that, there was no evidence 
that the Defendants at issue had any notion that 
their tender of payments to Plaintiffs would have 
been a futile act. 
Clearly Defendant's claim that the timeliness of the 
default notice barred any action for default 
subsequent to the month of February 1991 fell short 
of satisfying the threshold burden that Plaintiffs 
could not produce sufficient credible evidence to 
reasonably support a finding in Plaintiffs' favor as 
to whether Defendants were in default for nonpayment 
for the months of March 1991 and April 1991, Bridge 
v. Backman, 353 P.2d 909 (Utah 1960); accord Krantz 
v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991); Billings v. Union 
Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991), 
particularly in light of the fact there was 
considerable evidence to preclude summary judgment 
on that issue. 
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of fact as to whether the Defendant defaulted under the contract 
for failure to make payments under the contract for the months of 
March 1991 and April 1991, the award of attorney fees must be 
reversed until such determination is settled. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS A BREACHING (DEFAULTING) PARTY UNDER 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS NOT LEGALLY JUSTIFIED. 
This court has stated that "if provided for by 
contract, the award of attorney fees is allowed only in accordance 
with the terms of the contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citing Trayner v. Cushina, 688 P.2d 448, 
450 (Utah 1984). 
In the present case, paragraph 21 of the contract 
between the parties provides: 
The Buyer and Seller each 
agree that should they default 
in any of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, 
that the defaulting party 
shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, 
which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing this agreement, or 
in obtaining possession of the 
premises covered hereby, or in 
pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by the statutes 
of the State of Utah whether 
such remedy is pursued by 
filing a suit or otherwise. 
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Accordingly, in order for attorney fees to be awarded 
against the Plaintiff, the district court must conclude that the 
Plaintiff defaulted under the terms of the contract. Here, the 
court first ruled that: 
6. The plaintiffs' 
declaration of acceleration 
and attempted foreclosure of 
the contract is a breach of 
that contract. 
The above conclusion lacks basis in fact and law 
inasmuch as the Plaintiff proceeded pursuant to express terms of 
the uniform real estate contract which prescribed that in the event 
the Defendant had not made a payment within thirty (30) days, the 
party had the absolute option of declaring acceleration. In this 
case, the January 1991 payment was in default anytime after 
February 14, 1991 (30 days after January 15). Not only did the 
Plaintiffs maintain at trial that they never received the alleged 
February 14, 1991 payment, even the Defendant's witnesses testified 
that such payment was not mailed until a few days after February 
14, 1991.5 Accordingly, where defendant had an absolute right 
under the contract to declare acceleration, the court erred in 
See Transcript at pp. Ill and 129; see also 
transcript of the ruling. 
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concluding that he breached the contract for doing so. 
Even the court in its ruling acknowledges that 
acceleration was legally justified, although not 
equitably justified. The court stated: 
Now, I have indicated 
even though in the best light 
to the defendant, if tender 
were as I have indicated is my 
holding, if the payments were 
tendered, they were still 
late. But does that 
constitute a breach under 
these circumstances where 
acceleration could then be 
justified pursuant to the 
uniform real estate contract 
as evidenced by P-l? Mr 
Wilson, as he correctly stated 
many times, that forfeiture 
then becomes a question of 
equity. And it is my opinion 
that equity would forbid me 
from allowing the acceleration 
of this contract based upon 
questionable $95 missed 
payments. Even though they 
were, as I indicated tendered, 
but late, they were late only 
on the February payment— 
excuse me, on the January 
payment. They were late only 
by one or two days. 
Transcript of ruling at 10-11. 
Based on the foregoing, while equitable 
principles may have barred acceleration by 
Plaintiff, neither legal or equitable principles 
direct that the Plaintiffs, who simply proceeded 
pursuant to the explicit language of the contract, 
were defaulting or breaching parties under the 
contract so as to have attorney fees awarded against 
them. 
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The court also concluded that: 
8. Plaintiffs' actions 
in taking over the property 
constitute a breach of the 
contract between the parties. 
In the instant case, the court's ruling presupposes 
that the Plaintiff employed self-help measures in taking over the 
subject property.7 However, as reflected in the record, Plaintiffs 
employed appropriate legal means, filing a motion to appoint a 
receiver on or about June 11, 1991 based on the complaint filed 
previously on June 7, 199l.8 Pursuant to the substantiated 
allegations set forth in the complaint, Judge Daniels determined 
that appointment of a receiver was warranted and ordered the same.9 
Based on that, it is beyond the prerogative of the district court 
to now determine that the Plaintiffs breached the contract by 
seeking and receiving judicial redress notwithstanding the ultimate 
outcome of the proceedings. 
Based on the foregoing, the district court erred in 
concluding that the Plaintiffs breached the uniform real estate 
7
 See Findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
8
 Counsel for the Defendant argued below that the 
motion to appoint a receiver was ex-parte and 
therefore inappropriate. However, as reflected in 
the record, the motion was filed on June 11, 1991 
and Defendant's counsel did not enter her appearance 
until on or about July 3, 1991. 
9
 R. at 16-17. 
18 
contract between the parties. Further, because Plaintiffs did not 
breach the contract and since attorney fees can only be awarded 
against a defaulting or breaching party thereunder, the court 
abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to the 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request that this 
Court reverse the ruling of the district court that the Plaintiffs 
defaulted under the uniform real estate contract so as to entitle 
the Defendant to an award of attorney fees. In the alternative, 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the court's partial summary judgment, 
necessitating remand of this case to the district court for further 
proceedings to determine whether there was a default for the months 
of March 1991 and April 1991. 
DATED this _ day of May, 1994. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVAN STRASRYPKA and KAREN B. ] 
STRASRYPKA, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
BYRON J. WILSON, CLELLA F. | 
GLAZIER, CFG INVESTMENT CO. , ] 
WESTPORT FUNDING CO. , and ] 
JOHN DOES ONE THROUGH FIVE, ] 
i ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
I WESTPORT' S MOTION FOR 
l PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 91-0903626-PR 
i Judge GlenniC Iwasaki 
Defendant Westport Funding Company7 s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment having come on before the court for oral argument 
on the 10th day of March, 1993, the Hon. Glen S. Iwasaki presiding, 
defendant Westport Funding being represented by its counsel Leslie 
Van Frank of and for COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. , plaintiffs 
being represented by their counsel Donald Wilson of and for WILSON 
& WILSON, the court having reviewed the pleadings filed in support 
of and in opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
T h i r d j ' j JHC i : ^ O .bu iC i 
MAR 1 S 1S93 
/SALT LAK£ COUNTY 
By >.f\ , ••» u ^ i , C'P • 
nnQ7,' : 
having heard the argument of counsel, and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion is granted, 
and the court hereby determines that the only issue of any alleged 
default remaining for trial is whether or not the January 1991 and/ 
or February 1991 payments were made or timely tendered. 
DATED this ( fe day of March, J.993. 
BY THE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WILSON & WILSON 
j£c*~*~^ 
Hon. Isienr^. Iwasaki 
Donald Wilson 
Attorneys for plaintiffs 
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COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
." r- A 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MARCH 16, 1993; A.M. SESSION 
2 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 
3 I have a firm grasp of the testimony in this 
4 matter. I would like to take some time to review the 36 
5 exhibits that have been received in this. I intend to 
6 render a decision today so no one will have to go away 
7 thinking about what my decision will be. We will be in 
8 informal recess until I notify you all that I am ready to 
9 render a decision. Please just hang around. 
10 We will be in informal recess until then. 
11 (Informal recess taken.) 
12 THE COURT: We are back in session after informal 
13 recess to allow me time to consider the evidence in this 
14 matter. 
15 To begin with, I want to thank counsel for the 
16 manner in which the evidence was presented. It wasn't a 
17 complicated case but I do appreciate the manner in which 
18 the counsel were accommodating to each other to the Court 
19 and the presentation of the evidence. 
20 As I review the facts of this case, it is clear 
21 that the issues that I have to consider is whether or not 
22 there was a payment that was tendered for the months of 
23 January and February of 1991 to the plaintiffs by the 
24 defendant. And if their answer to that was yes, then the 
25 next question is were they ever received by the defendant? 
3 
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1 And then if they wasn't ever received by the 
2 defendant—excuse me. If it was never received by the 
3 plaintiff, then was the defendant responsible for the 
4 payment, either nontendered, or not paid, or not received 
5 by the plaintiff in this matter. 
6 There has been considerable conflict regarding 
7 testimony as to the plaintiff, Mr. Alvan Strasrypka, 
8 regarding whether or not he had ever received checks in 
9 question. Ever received checks in question. The exhibits 
10 in question are evidenced by Exhibit Number P-4 and the 
11 first check attached to Defendant's Exhibit D-22. 
12 While there is conflict as to whether he has 
13 received those, or the time in which he received them, or 
14 the manner in which he received them, there is also 
15 conflict regarding the check of Clella Glazier, dated 
16 January 1st, 1991, and whether or not that was for a 
17 December 1990 payment, or for a January 1991 payment. 
18 It seems to be no question that the uniform real 
19 estate contract in question here, that being P-l indicated 
20 there was a $95 payment due on the 15th of every month and 
21 the 30-day grace period given thereto. 
22 That 30-day grace period becomes problematic in 
23 the analysis of the facts, as well as the presentation of 
24 the facts, for it overlaps and it becomes confusing as to 
25 which payment was being—whether it was actually received, 
4 
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1 was for whatever date it was, whether it was for the 
2 present month or the preceding month. But regardless of 
3 which, that's what the terms of the contract says. 
4 Furthermore, it does indicate that if, in fact, 
5 there is a default in payments, that the plaintiff or the 
6 holder of the paper could accelerate the contract demand 
7 that all payments be accelerated, and in this case that was 
8 the election of the Strasrypkas in this matter, and they so 
9 informed all counsel—then informed all parties, pursuant 
10 to a notice on May of 1991, and that was D-14. Correct me 
11 if I am wrong on that counsel. 
12 To begin with, the check from Clella Glazier, 
13 dated January 1 of 1991, while there is conflict as to her 
14 admissions versus an affidavit to resolve that, I looked to 
15 other evidence, and it is unquestioned that in the ten 
16 years plus that the plaintiffs were receiving payments from 
17 Mrs. Glazier, it indicated that she always made the 
18 payments, or generally made the payments around the second 
19 or the fifth of every month, and that was for the preceding 
20 month' rent, and that she was never late, meaning never 
21 paid after the grace period had expired. 
22 In semantics, what we are talking about is 
23 whether a payment was late, it is my view and I so hold 
24 that a late payment would be those payments that were 
25 received or paid after the expiration of the grace period. 
5 
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1 That is a late payment. 
2 Whether or not Mrs. Glazier ever made any late 
3 payments, it is my holding that she did not, although they 
4 were not exactly on the 19th of every month. Pursuant to 
5 my definition of what is a late payment, she was never 
6 late. Her course of habit and custom was, she would tender 
7 payments on the first or second or by the fifth of every 
8 month. It is consistent with the January 1st payment of 
9 1991 being made payable on the December 1990 payment. 
10 With that out of the way we have to look at 
11 whether or not there were payments for the months of 
12 January and February of 1991. During that time the 
13 property in question was under sale. The Westport Funding, 
14 through Mr. Cutler, was purchasing this property; did in 
15 fact. And there is no question that there was negotiated 
16 arrangement meetings and final settlement of that purchase. 
17 And that was done by and through Western States Title. 
18 The settlement statements, as evidence by D-25, 
19 indicating buyers and settlement payments, that being two 
20 pages, show that in fact on that area or that time in 
21 question there was settlement that had gone through Western 
22 States Title, and that certain amounts of money were 
23 designated and certain checks were cut pursuant to the 
24 settlement. 
25 When there is a conflict in the evidence between 
6 
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1 the principals, I must then have to look toward independent 
2 evidence, if any there be, regarding what position that I 
3 should take. I rely very heavily upon the testimony of 
4 Lori Pimm and that of Michelle Wallace regarding their 
5 understanding and their course of conduct concerning the 
6 settlement at this time. 
7 Defendant's Exhibit D-22, that being the balance 
8 sheet, indicates that there was on 2-14-91 a check cut for 
9 $95 payable to the plaintiff in this matter, and on the 
10 face of the Defendant's D-22, it indicates there was a 
11 February contract payment. That is further evidenced by 
12 the first check in D-22 dated 2-14-91 on the account of 
13 Western States Title made may able to the plaintiff in the 
14 amount of $95. 
15 It is true that there is no documentation but 
16 rather testimonial evidence from Michelle Wallace regarding 
17 conversation that she had with the plaintiff, Alvan 
18 Strasrypka, regarding the receipt of these funds. 
19 In order for me to disbelieve her, I would have 
20 to be convinced there was some sort of general conspiracy 
21 among those people at Western States, particularly Pimm and 
22 Wallace, as well as Cutler, who conspired together to 
23 concoct this story, that in fact checks and—and go to the 
24 extent of copying nonexistent checks, if any there be, 
25 would go to the extent of having me to believe that she was 
7 
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1 lying, to show there was a general conspiracy among those 
2 parties to somehow not pay the plaintiff a $95 payment when 
3 in fact we are talking about a closing that included 
4 $200,000 in total property, of which this property in 
5 question was just a small amount. I do not reach that 
6 point. 
7 I am not convinced by my analysis of the evidence 
8 that Ms. Wallace is lying to this court or that she is 
9 somehow lying to support some position that she may have. 
10 She is an independent witness as far as I'm concerned. 
11 Western States is out of business. She has no tie. It has 
12 been indicated to Mr. Cutler—even Lori Pimm, who's other 
13 name is Cutler, is not related to Mr. Cutler. That was 
14 made clear by Ms. Van Frank—but she would also have to be 
15 a party to this conspiracy to keep $95 payment away from 
16 the plaintiff. 
17 If there is no conspiracy, and if I receive at 
18 face value that the plaintiff never received these monies, 
19 which there seems to be some question about, then there has 
20 to be some negligence on the part of Western States, 
21 because it is undoubtedly—there is no question that it was 
22 not Mr. Cutler who had made arrangements to make the 
23 payment of the February '91 payment, but rather that came 
24 out of the closing. 
25 Now whether or not any negligence of Western 
8 
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1 States not to timely make the payment to the plaintiff 
2 should go to the benefit of the plaintiff and in that way 
3 it would go to his benefit, if I find there was a breach of 
4 the contract and therefore allow acceleration or should the 
5 defendant, Westport, Mr. Cutler be held responsible for 
6 whatever negligence of not mailing those checks out, the 
7 testimony was custom and habit indicates that at the end of 
8 the close goes checks would be made out. As indicated by 
9 D-22, the first check that was dated 2-14-91, that was, 
10 according to custom, mailed out that night or the night 
11 after. Even assuming that it was mailed out the night 
12 after, it would still be an untimely payment of the January 
13 payment because it was without the 30-day grace period. It 
14 was further then the 30-day grace period upon receipt by 
15 the plaintiff in this matter, Mr. Strasrypka. 
16 On the other hand, question then comes up why 
17 would P-4, that being the check dated 2-26-91 ever be cut 
18 by Western States in the first place. The only logical 
19 explanation of that would be the telephone conversation 
20 that Ms. Wallace had with the plaintiff regarding the fact 
21 that he had received February's payment but where is 
22 January's payment. 
23 Western States, without doing any other checking 
24 on a $95 check, paid it out. Paid it on 2-26-91. Once 
25 again, that is an untimely payment but it was tendered, and 
9 
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1 the tender is, what is important here, and also, who is 
2 responsible for that tender is important to my analysis, 
3 for I reiterate that it was not Mr. Cutler that was 
4 responsible for the cutting of those checks. That was done 
5 during the whole closing. So what I am holding is there 
6 was tender of both the January and February payments and 
7 whether or not that was ever received by the plaintiff is 
8 another question. 
9 If it was never received by the plaintiff, then 
10 whose responsibility is it for that non-payment? And in my 
11 estimation it was not on Mr. Cutler, but if there be any 
12 blame, that would be to Western States for not doing that. 
13 Now, I have indicated even though in the best 
14 light to the defendant, if tender were as I have indicated 
15 is my holding, if the payments were tendered, they were 
16 still late. But does that constitute a breach under these 
17 circumstances where acceleration could then be justified 
18 pursuant to the uniform real estate contract as evidenced 
19 by P-l? Mr. Wilson, as he correctly stated many times, 
20 that forfeiture then becomes a question of equity. And it 
21 is my opinion that equity would forbid me from allowing the 
22 acceleration of this contract based upon questionable $95 
23 missed payments. Even though they were, as I indicated, 
24 tendered, but late, they were late only on the February 
25 payment—excuse me, on the January payment. They were late 
10 
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1 only K" ~" two days. 
2 ' assume, win h i '" «.'i 1 .- 2-14 
3 . : . . . . . . I payment would 
4 only . February would) 
5 February payment have been expired, 
6 not have expired until March 17th, I 
7 believe w a s M s . Van Franl< e 
8 February nniy * cherefore *-n oecomes 
9 issue as to whether - • . *** - oayment 
10 late would give rise acceleration 
liii'i I d«ft,e;i iiiill,!;? that; there was in fact a default of those 
I payments. 
1.1 It has been tendered iWiJ i emains to be tendered 
11 lieve the funds are downstairs in the clerk's 
l'i office, as '.he rent in this matter n 
ii paid, ILK* xu * nn.iu'i IH.JL l/Hat: money be released 
i i" and i >JA,I payments . those missed months will be made up by 
III releasing those funds ± want, I. o reitoialt-' Uiui. Lhw 
' -- -' v nrevents me from allowing an 
Ml _ era ted demand . payment ci :-L- based upon iity 
A , analysis that endering * * f Ho 
2/ January payme* only a couple • • .:
 : •; and 
1
' < - iraconian measure to be taken IL 
24 payment of that amount. 
25 When* Uu-?re has been some testimony of lyi rig and 
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1 stealing and cheating in this case, I needn't reach that 
2 point and I don't impute any criminal interest nor criminal 
3 actions on the part of any parties in this matter. 
4 As to anybody claiming equity of $20,000, once 
5 again I don't impute any criminal actions, however, the 
6 realities of such would be that if the equity in this 
7 property is $20,000, which is uncontroverted, then by 
8 virtue of a two or three dollar late payment, and if Mr. 
9 Cutler could not make the $9,600 payment, he would in 
10 effect be losing any equity that he had in that property. 
11 Whether or not that was equity that he had gained over 
12 years and years of making a $95 payment or as the truth in 
13 this matter is that he had gained by buying out the 
14 interest of Clella Glazier, remains to be irrelevant, but 
15 the end effect of which, if I allowed this matter, would be 
16 that he would lose $20,000 in equity based upon a factual 
17 three day missing of a payment for the January payment, and 
18 I refuse to do that. 
19 Damages in this matter, as everyone indicates, is 
20 overwhelmingly attorneys fees. I will allow damages in the 
21 amount of $480 for the difference in which Westport could 
22 have done the services as indicated by Defendant's Number 
23 18, that being the plaintiff's accounting, and what the 
24 plaintiff expended. So with that, $480 is awarded. 
25 I am not awarding $880 in the increase rent 
12 
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1 value, I'm not awarding any amount for the increase 
2 rent value y even if it was $'?\\ I .mi not convinced by the 
3 evidenr convincing enough nature that 
4 fact rent increases were .. anticipated t 
5 going to occur iu e.i . *** i i i ' :\ , 
6 As to attorneys fees would request that rxo. 
7 Van Frank give me affidavits r. 
8 Wilson to examine objections that 
9 hi-. i 1""!, have. If necessary, -. -.?:- *• ?r ^u an 
evidentiary hearing regarding the .Vm «; miri ;•»! attorneys fees 
and as ind imount at attorneys fees is the 
-giant part of the damages . latter. 
It appears that ^o options, 
once e corner--pushed \ corner t aving 
to either pay $9,600 forfeit the property 
which had an estimate He hac , 
. . matter. He had no recourse 
except obtain counsel and to litigat *v 
x S the end result. 
20 blame either party doing that. This 
21 seems I . problem - .. - system. *. 
22 talking abouu ALL excess : the vaiut.- f 
23 i In - i.nupeity we are talking attorney fees t.-: *- excess ui 
24 the accumulated payments that were i s 
25 matter. And U^JL^ editorializing 
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1 as to the futility of having a trial in this instance 
2 concerning these types of issues with the amounts of 
3 attorneys fees that are involved. We are talking about 
4 $30,000 in attorneys fees and I find that to be appalling 
5 but I blame neither side. 
6 I believe that the plaintiffs, pursuant to the 
7 technical reading of the contract, had the right to go 
8 forward once the discovery was more or less completed, 
9 though I believe there should have been some earnest 
10 compromise on both sides to resolve this case short of 
11 trial. It was not my ruling as I have stated. 
12 Any questions as to what I have held so far? 
13 MS. VAN FRANK: The only question I would have, 
14 your Honor, is time frame on communications of objection to 
15 the affidavit on fees, which I believe is here now. We can 
16 submit the affidavit to the Court right now and have a time 
17 frame as to objections. 
18 THE COURT: How long, Mr. Wilson, do you think it 
19 will talk you to form any objections, and if necessary, to 
20 supply those to the Court? 
21 MR. WILSON: Two weeks would be enough, your 
22 Honor. 
23 THE COURT: All right. You will have until the 
24 30th. Give him a copy of those today and he will have 
25 until the 30th to makes objections. 
14 
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1 MS. VAN FRANK: \\ 'mi M V"-< ' Like us to submit those 
2 • , i 11 \ i j I I j d a v 1 1 i L s « J i n UVJ ? 
3 THE COURT: Yes, You can the 
4 file and give , 
5 Have -nything out? No punj_tive damages 
6 were earnestly requested, damages are awarded. 
7 ,RjyslKS Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Anything else# Mr. n 
9 MR. WILSON: YHU , VIMI i n licated that the payment 
in • li "i i.1 n iii a i i i wild i did you want done with those? 
THE COURT: Wei think that been 
made on a monthly i«r\/e been accruing 
think they should be released to the 
Strasrypkas for the payments ui L dl. they had 
not received. 
MS. VAN FRANK: It may makes sense, your 
release - portion of them Lne minimal 
.amages that you have awarded, that 
• u c :-^;i,^i •• ~s: jiv*.: M* . Cutler iixs Jl"""'"" :" z. uui 
1
 son w his 
21 orders 
22 THE COURT: Do you have any objection ? 
23 ME, WILSON: I |« •• :tion to that, your 
24 Honoi , M » ih,11 .._ r • nere at this time, 
25 provided those ..-. ; __ _~.- payments thni' i«':?r«' lue, we 
] 5 
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1 would deduct the 480 from that? 
2 THE COURT: That is correct 
3 MR. WILSON: And with courts order I would 
4 withdraw that and make that $480 payment to counsel. 
5 THE COURT: No, I think what she is saying is 
6 that she will keep $480 give you the rest out of money that 
7 is downstairs 
8 MS. VAN FRANK: The Clerk of Court release the 
9 480 to you, the rest would be released to me. We will 
10 continue to make timely payments. 
11 MR. WILSON: Okay. 
12 THE COURT: Or any other manner in which you all 
13 feel comfortable. 
14 MR. WILSON: Maybe I better restate what you want 
15 done on that payment. 
16 THE COURT: I am going to restate it. All the 
17 rents be paid to them. The $480 you pay it to them, then 
18 the downstairs does not have to get involved in any 
19 accounting or anything else like that. 
20 MR. STRASRYPKA: Rent or contract payment? 
21 MS. VAN FRANK: Contract payments. 
22 THE COURT: Contract payment. 
23 MS. VAN FRANK: If they haven't already been 
24 returned. 
25 THE COURT: The haven't already been returned, 
16 
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1
 i understanding, pursuant ~ w 
ordering $480 more ww *^ e paia c. ?n 
^ essence, 
4 MR. WILSON: And balance? 
5 THE COURT: Well ilance. The 
6 cont downstairs for the months this c ase has 
7 been pending will be turned over to you . .$ 
8 and assuming thev have ;*.-* .::,t:> 
9 . • i- • they are curren -hen 
10 receive that, _ whenever you i 
11 _ $480— 
12 MR. WILSON: That is okay, That's as 1 
13- understood That's what I was pro!luring. 
THi" COURT: Okay. Then as to objections, you 
have until the 30th of March to file your objections. 
at those and »l.o «,»ii them without 
evider i , tin e n I w i l l c a l l y o u 
back In tor an evidentiary hearing regarding the • iin< -uni -f 
reasonableness of fees. 
/> M !?-. Tn the meantime, shall 
prepared proposed findings and conclusions as 
*V --_ oncerned? 
23 -:1±. t'OUH'l '. Tl"4- was my last request .' -• ^r Ms. 
24 Van Frank, since you arc revail . - s 
25 matter, please subm i \ -I, \\q\ . ; conclusions to Mr. 
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1 Wilson before you submit them to me, 
2 I am sure you are going to have to get a copy of 
3 the transcript from the reporter. 
4 MS, VAN FRANK: We'd appreciate that. 
5 MR. WILSON: As is your ruling as to the 
6 existence of a contract, have you made a ruling as for that 
7 is the continuation of the contract? 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, I mean you are all bound by the 
9 terms and conditions of the contract: $95 a month until it 
10 is paid off. I thought it interesting to look at the 
11 amortization that by the time it gets paid off sometime in 
12 2006 or 2008 that extraordinarily high amount of interest 
13 has been paid on a $13,000 loan but that's another issue 
14 that I will take up another time. 
15 Anything else all right? Nothing else then, we 
16 will be in recess. 
17 
18 
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1 FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 91-0903626-PR 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
the 16th day of March, 1993 before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, 
Judge, presiding, and sitting without jury. The plaintiffs were 
present and represented by Donald L. Wilson of WILSON & WILSON, 
Attorneys. The defendant Westport Funding Company was present by 
the presence of Duane Cutler, and represented by Leslie Van Frank 
of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. The defendant Byron J. Wilson 
was present but was not represented by counsel. No other defen-
dants were present or represented. 
-, s> M A " 
ALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
The present parties, through their respective counsels, 
stipulated that the defendants Byron J. Wilson, Clella F. Glazier 
(deceased), C.F.G. Investment Co., and the remaining unnamed 
defendants, had no further interest in and to the property or in 
the proceedings and the cause of action against those individuals 
was dismissed. 
The Court, by way of prior partial summary judgments, 
ruled that the contract in question was not in default by virtue of 
non-payment of or failure to provide for hazard insurance upon the 
premises or for any lack of loss payee assignment, and that the 
only issue of any alleged default remaining for trial by this Court 
was whether or not the January and February 1991 payments due under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract that is the subject of this case 
were made or timely tendered. The Court, therefore, proceeded to 
hear the testimony of witnesses, accept and review exhibits pro-
ferred by the parties' counsels, heard arguments and proffers by 
counsel, and having been fully advised of the premises therein, the 
Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Alvan Strasrypka and Karen B. Strasrypka, the plain-
tiffs herein, are the record title owners of the real property that 
is the subject of this lawsuit, more particularly described as: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 73, 
Plat ,!CM, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 
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53.5 feet; thence North 90 feet; thence West 53.5 feet; 
thence South 90 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO A RIGHT OF WAY over the East 5 feet thereof, 
and together with a right of way 5 feet wide adjoining on 
the East side of said tract. 
ALSO subject to a right of way over the West 1/2 rod 
thereof. 
2. The plaintiffs7 interest in the property is subject 
to a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated September 12, 1975, by and 
between A.A. Strasrypka and plaintiff Alvan Strasrypka as sellers 
and Byron J. Wilson as buyer (hereafter "Contract"). (Ex. PI) 
3. Defendant Westport Funding Company is the assignee 
of the buyer's interest in the Contract, having obtained its 
interest in February 1991. (Tr. p. 79) 
4. Westport Funding purchased its interest from C.F.G. 
Investment Company as part of a package of properties, the total 
sales price of which was in the $200,000.00 range. (Tr. pps. 121-
22) . 
5. The Contract provides for a thirty (3 0) day grace 
period for payments. (Ex. PI) 
6. Clella Glazier regularly mailed her payments to 
Alvan Strasrypka from the time Mr. Strasrypka's father died in 1980 
for more than ten years. (Tr. p. 45) . 
fi044~i 
7. Alvan Strasrypka accepted all such payments from 
Clella Glazier without objection to the method of delivery, i.e., 
mailing. (Tr. p. 45). 
8. On or about January 1, 1991, Clella Glazier tendered 
a $95.00 check to Alvan Strasrypka, which check Mr. Strasypka 
accepted and cashed. (Tr. p. 21). 
9. The January 1, 1991 check was for the payment that 
was due on December 15, 1990. 
10. On February 14 or 15, 1991, Western States Title 
Company mailed a check dated February 14, 1991 in the amount of 
$95.00 to Alvan Strasrypka. (Page 2 of Ex. D22; Tr. Ill, 118). 
11. Alvan Strasrypka received the February 14 check from 
Western States Title. (Tr. pp. 112-13, 129). 
12. After receiving the February 14 check, Mr. Stras-
rypka called the title company and complained that he was also owed 
the January payment. (Tr. pp. 112, 129). 
13. In response to Mr. Strasrypka's complaint, the title 
company prepared another check, dated February 26, 1991 in the 
amount of $95.00 payable to Alvan Strasrypka, and mailed it to him 
on that day or on February 27, 1991. (Ex. P4; Tr. pp. 113) . The 
funds for this check had come from the closing of another of the 
properties that Westport Funding was purchasing from C.F.G. 
Investment. (Tr. p. 114) . 
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14. Western States Title Company had sufficient funds in 
its trust account to pay the February 14 and February 26 checks. 
(Tr. p. 115). 
15. Several days after the February 26th check was 
mailed, Alvan Strasrypka again called the title company. This time 
he asserted that Mrs. Glazier could not assign the contract, and he 
wanted to be paid in full. (Tr. pp. 131-32). 
16. On March 28, 1991, plaintiffs' attorney mailed the 
February 26 check back to the title company. (Tr. p. 31; Ex. P9) 
17. Plaintiffs then asserted that there was a default 
under the contract, asserted an acceleration of the contract, and 
on April 2, 1991, mailed a Notice of Default to Byron Wilson. (Tr. 
pp. 27-28; Ex. P7). 
18. At all times from and after April 2, 1991, the 
plaintiffs have refused tender of any payment except the full 
amount claimed as due under the terms of the contract. (R. 
[Motion for Partial Summary Judgment]). 
19. Prior to trial, a payment for each month from 
January 1991 to the date of trial had been tendered into court, and 
at the time of trial were being held by the clerk of the court 
pending further court order. (R. ). 
20. Prior to the opening of evidence at trial, defendant 
Westport's counsel proffered tender of all payments, from January 
5 
1991 to the date of trial, which tender plaintiffs refused. (Tr. 
pp. 9-10) . 
21. Sometime during May 1991, plaintiffs sent the 
tenants of the property notice that they had taken over and that 
all future rents were to be made to plaintiffs. (Ex. D19) . 
Thereafter, and without the consent of Westport, plaintiffs 
collected June 1991 rents from the tenants. (Tr. p. 170; Ex. Pll) . 
22. Although plaintiffs were aware that defendant 
Westport was represented by counsel, they approached the court ex 
parte and obtained an order appointing plaintiff Alvan Strasrypka 
as receiver of the property. (Exs. Pll, P12, P13; R. ). The 
plaintiffs did not tell the court that that they had already taken 
over the property by self-help, nor that they had failed to give 
notice to defendant Westport or its counsel of their motion to 
appoint Mr. Strasrypka as receiver. (R. ) . 
23. After being appointed as receiver, Alvan Strasrypka 
continued to collect the rents, and from those rents paid himself 
$12.0 0 per hour for such tasks as mowing the lawn. (Ex. D18) 
24. During his tenure as receiver, Alvan Strasrypka 
failed to pay the water bill for almost six months (Tr. pp. 173, 
180-81; Ex. D18). 
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25. By its order dated April 13, 1992, this court 
vacated its previous order appointing Mr. Strasrypka as receiver. 
(R. ) . 
26. From the $4,260.00 Alvan Strasrypka collected as 
rents from the property, he kept $1,270.76 before remitting the 
remainder to Westport on April 7, 1992. (Ex. D18) 
27. The funds Mr. Strasrypka kept were expended as 
follows: 
a. $317.14 was paid to utilities and $355.74 was 
paid for property taxes, for a total of $682.88. (Ex. D18) 
b. The remaining $587.98 was disbursed to Alvan 
Strasrypka himself for parts, tools, mileage, and labor at the rate 
of $12.00 per hour. (Ex. D18) 
28. Had Westport Funding been in possession of the 
property during Alvan Strasrypka7s receivership, its out-of-pocket 
expenditures would have included the $682.88 for utilities and 
taxes, and $108.00 for maintenance and repairs. (Tr. pp. 182-83). 
29. Westport would not have expended the extra $487.98 
that Mr. Strasypka paid himself as receiver. (Tr. p. 182-86). 
30. Westport had $20,000.00 equity in the property at 
the time the lawsuit was filed. (Tr. p. 189) 
31. The principal balance of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract after payment of the January 15, 1993 payment was in 
7 
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exces s of $9 ,600 .00 . (Ex. P2; R. [Motion fo r P a r t i a l Summary 
Judgmen t ] ) . 
32. Despite plaintiffs' attempted acceleration, Westport 
Funding did not have the ability to pay the principal balance. (Tr. 
p. 87) . 
33. As of March 15, 1993, Westport Funding has incurred 
$14,221.50 in attorneys fees and $503.50 in recoverable costs in 
defending this action and in protecting its interest in the real 
property. The billing rates explained in the Affidavit of Leslie 
Van Frank are reasonable and within the market range of fees 
charged by other attorneys and paralegals in Utah with comparable 
qualifications and experience. The services indicated in the 
affidavit were reasonably and necessarily undertaken to defend 
against the plaintiffs' action and to recover the property from the 
plaintiffs' receivership. The sum of $14,221.50 is a fair and 
reasonable attorneys fee in this matter as of March 15, 1993. 
34. Defendant Westport Funding is also entitled to its 
attorneys fees in the amount of $2,502.50, as established by 
Supplemental Affidavit of Leslie Van Frank, for the trial of this 
matter and the preparation of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and to such additional attorneys fees incurred for post-
trial proceedings to the time of entry of judgment, as shall be 
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established by affidavit. These fees were also reasonably and 
necessarily incurred in the defense of this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Westport Funding Company is the assignee of the 
buyer's interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
September 12, 1975. 
2. Under the terms of the contract, if the payments 
were made more than 3 0 days after they were due, plaintiffs were 
entitled to declare an acceleration of the principal amount due, 
elect to treat the contract as a note and mortgage, and to 
foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
3. Plaintiffs declared acceleration on April 2, 1991. 
4. A valid tender of all amounts due under the contract 
was made to the plaintiffs before April 2, 1991. 
5. The valid tender of the payments cut off the plain-
tiffs' right to declare acceleration. (Homeowner Loan Corporation 
v. Washington, 161 P.2d 355, (Utah 1945). 
6. The plaintiffs7 declaration of acceleration and 
attempted foreclosure of the contract is a breach of that contract. 
7. The contract was not in default for non-payment on 
April 2, 1991 or at any time thereafter. 
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8. Plaintiffs wrongfully took over the property by 
self-help and in violation of Rule 66, U.R.Civ.P. 
9. Plaintiffs7 actions in wrongfully taking over the 
property constitute a breach of the contract between the parties. 
10. Plaintiffs' actions in taking over the property by 
self-help constitutes unclean hands. 
11. Foreclosure is an equitable proceeding. 
12. Equity prevents plaintiffs from foreclosing. 
DATED this/ y^'^day of November, 1993 
BY TI 
jlenn K. Iwasaki 
District Court Judge 
10 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Westport Funding Company 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 s \m 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVAN STRASRYPKA and KAREN B, 
STRASRYPKA, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BYRON J. WILSON, CLELLA F. 
GLAZIER, CFG INVESTMENT CO., 
WESTPORT FUNDING CO., and 
JOHN DOES ONE THROUGH FIVE, 
J U D G M E N T 
C i v i l No. 91-0903626-PR 
Judge Glenn*d Iwasaki 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on the 15th day of November, 1993 regarding the 
trial of this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's cause of action against defendant 
Westport Funding Company is hereby dismissed, no cause of action. 
2. Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against defendants 
Byron J. Wilson, Clella F. Glazier and C.F.G. Investment Company 
A r. A r 
declaring that those defendants have no interest in the following 
real property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 73, 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 
53.5 feet; thence North 90 feet; thence West 53.5 feet; 
thence South 90 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO A RIGHT OF WAY over the East 5 feet thereof, 
and together with a right of way 5 feet wide adjoining on 
the East side of said tract. 
ALSO subject to a right of way over the West 1/2 rod 
thereof. 
3. The Uniform Real Estate Contract dated September 12, 
1975, by and between A.A. Strasrypka and plaintiff Alvan Strasrypka 
as sellers and Byron J. Wilson as buyer, in which defendant 
Westport Funding Company now owns the buyer's interest, is hereby 
declared to be in full force and effect. 
4. Defendant Westport is awarded judgment against 
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, as follows: 
a. $487.98 damages. 
b. $20,673.25 attorneys fees. 
c. $503.50 costs, 
for a total judgment of $21,664.73. 
5. The clerk of the court is hereby ordered to release 
to plaintiffs all the funds currently held in trust, less $487.98, 
which the clerk of the court is hereby ordered to release to 
defendant Westport Funding Company to be applied against the 
j udgment. 
n r\ A vz o 
DATED t h i s day of November, 1993 
BY THE^dOtS 
Glenni^ Iwasaki 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WILSON & WILSON 
U n R.cJJL^ 
Donald Wilson 
Attorneys for plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was sent via First Class mail on the 1 (o> day of 
November, 1993 to the following: 
Donald R. Wilson 
WILSON & WILSON 
5620 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
F:\lvf\strasrypka\judgment.pro 
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